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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Equity” is a buzz word that now pervades our national
political system in debates about taxation, immigration, and
healthcare reform. It was the main focus of the 2013 mayor race
in New York City, arguably propelling Mayor Bill de Blasio to
victory in a city that has the most inequitable distribution of
income in the nation.1 The debate has trickled down to parks,
where a handful of innovative private corporations have
transformed flagship parks while most neighborhood parks
languish.
This paper addresses the most innovative, alternative means
for funding parks in New York City and New York State. The
debate is critical in light of the chronic budget shortfalls of the
New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (NYC Parks)
* Christopher Rizzo is counsel at Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP and codirector of its environmental and land-use group.
1. Norm Fruchter, The Aftermath of the PS 2013 Campaign: Mayor de
Blasio’s First Hundred Days, ANNENBERG INSTITUTE FOR SCHOOL REFORM AT
BROWN UNIVERSITY (May 8, 2014), shttp://annenberginstitute.org/?q=commentary
/2014/05/aftermath-ps-2013-campaign-mayor-de-blasio’s-first-hundred-day,
archived at http://perma.cc/8S5D-VU66.
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and New York State Office of Parks Recreation and Historic
Preservation (OPRHP).2 Funding problems are likely to worsen
in coming years as parks compete for funding with aging
subways, bridges, water supply, and sewers. At the same time,
funding needs will grow: the City and State will increasingly rely
on coastal parks to serve as buffers to climate change.3 New and
existing waterfront parks will, in turn, require exponentially
more care and maintenance than traditional upland parks.
Private efforts have successfully transformed a select few
parks,4 which has created allegations of park inequity at a time
when many neighborhood parks are overgrown and
understaffed.5 Public-private partnerships reflect a national
debate about the proper role of the private sector in maintaining
parks, highways, bridges, and other essential civic infrastructure.
But for most neighborhood parks the debate is irrelevant. They
completely lack access to either adequate public funding or
private revenue. One-time infusions of public capital dollars into
the neediest parks cannot solve the ongoing operation and
maintenance problem.6
This paper identifies an array of alternative revenue
strategies to solve this inequitable situation. It then addresses
the challenge of adapting strategies developed in the highest
income communities to resolving disparate park conditions in
2. The New York League of Conservation Voters and New Yorkers for
Parks, led by executive directors Marcia Bystryn and Tupper Thomas
(respectively), jointly commissioned this paper. The viewpoints in this paper are
those of the author, not either organization.
3. PLANYC, NEW YORK CITY WETLANDS STRATEGY (2012), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/nyc_wetlands_strategy.pdf
[hereinafter N.Y.C. WETLANDS STRATEGY].
4. Some of the City’s most successful private park operators include Central
Park Conservancy, Bryant Park Corporation, Friends of the Highline, and
Prospect Park Alliance. Some parks are successfully operated by public benefit
corporations including the Battery Park City Authority, Brooklyn Bridge Park
Corporation, Hudson River Park Trust, Trust for Governors Island, and
Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation.
5. See Mara Gay, Inequality Seen in City Parks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230383430457952012265292129
0, archived at http://perma.cc/KY43-LA37.
6. See ALLIANCE FOR NEW YORK STATE PARKS, PROTECT THEIR FUTURE: NEW
YORK’S STATE PARKS IN CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.ptny.org/pdfs/
advocacy/parkreport2011.pdf [hereinafter ALLIANCE FOR PARKS].
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other neighborhoods. While this paper focuses on examples from
New York City, the practices discussed are applicable throughout
the State, including state parks that have also suffered from
funding shortfalls in the past decade.7
II.

ALTERNATIVE REVENUE OPTIONS

There is no substitute for adequate funding for parks from
the general budget. This paper, however, focuses on five
alternative, high-revenue options: (1) zoning incentives, (2) park
improvement districts, (3) partnerships with public infrastructure
agencies, (4) state public benefit corporations, and (5) existing
federal and state park funds that do not rely on new tax
revenues. These options are readily permitted by law and are
already in limited use. They therefore present the best options for
getting more money into parks without wading into the political
instability of Albany or Washington, D.C., or confronting the
nation’s antipathy to new taxes. The paper also briefly addresses
eight other revenue strategies that may be useful on a more
limited basis.8
This paper does not evaluate the legality of private
management of public parks. Despite criticism about the legality
of private operation of parks, the arrangement is perfectly legal
so long as it serves park purposes.9 In fact, conservancies
operating flagship parks are on the whole successful. Rather than
discourage creative, private management models, park advocates

7. See generally ALLIANCE FOR PARKS, supra note 6.
8. This paper does not address private philanthropy, which is highly
desirable, but an unlikely source of reliable maintenance funds for most parks.
The exclusion of private donations from this paper should not discourage park
advocates from pursuing private philanthropy in every way possible. The
Central Park Conservancy and Friends of the High Line have been very
successful in getting tens of millions of dollars in donations in the past few
years, which have transformed these corporations and the parks they operate.
E.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, New York Parks In Less Affluent Areas Lack Big Gifts,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/nyregion/newyork-parks-in-less-affluent-areas-lack-big-gifts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0,
archived at http://perma.cc/7TS3-3TVE.
9. See generally Robert M. Wolff & Mark B. Owens, A Review of Case Law
on Public-Private Cooperative Ventures, 3 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 16, 18
(1993).
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must embrace public-private partnerships if neighborhood parks
are to flourish.
III.

CITY AND STATE AUTHORITY TO PURSUE
ALTERNATIVE REVENUE SOURCES

The New York City Charter provides clear authority to the
Commissioner to pursue alternative revenues and public-private
partnerships,10 and the State’s highest court has repeatedly
affirmed the City’s authority to enter into private operation
agreements for portions of public parks. For example, in 795 Fifth
Ave. Corp. v. City of New York (1965), the New York Court of
Appeals approved a high-profile restaurant concession in Central
Park.11 In Union Square Park Cmty Coal. Inc. v. NYC Dep’t of
Parks & Recreation (2014), the New York Court of Appeals
approved the creation of a new restaurant in Union Square’s
historic pavilion.12 Courts have not yet addressed management
agreements that allocate responsibility for an entire park to a
private entity like the Central Park Conservancy. It is likely,
however, that courts will dismiss these sorts of challenges and
allow public-private partnerships so long as they genuinely
enhance rather than diminish the public’s overall use of a park.13
At the state level, the New York State Office of Parks
Recreation and Historic Preservation has wide discretion to
pursue public-private partnerships under state law.14 It does so
and raises about $100 million annually, providing over one half of
its operating budget.15 In fact, in 2009 the agency adopted its
“Policy on Public/Private Partnerships in New York State Parks

10. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 533(a)(10)-(11), (b)(4) (2013).
11. See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 205 N.E.2d 850, 851
(N.Y.1965).
12. See Union Square Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks &
Recreation, 8 N.E.3d 797, 801 (N.Y. 2014).
13. Union Square, 8 N.E.3d at 801 (“Commissioner is vested by law with
broad powers for the maintenance and improvement of the city's parks’ and that
judicial interference would be ‘justified only when a total lack of power is shown
. . . . ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
14. N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW § 3.09(6) (McKinney 2014).
15. See ALLIANCE FOR PARKS, supra note 6, at 5.
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and Historic Sites” to promote public-private revenue streams.16
New York City lacks a similar policy, but should develop one.
IV.

ZONING INCENTIVES

Zoning incentives provide the most promise for raising
significant funds for parks by allowing municipalities to tap
directly into the real estate industry for capital and maintenance
funds. State law authorizes municipalities to craft a variety of
zoning incentives to preserve open space, and two are worth
discussing in the context of maintaining existing parks.17 The
first would involve transfers of development rights (TDR),
whereby a municipality zones parks and sells the resulting
development rights in exchange for payments into an endowment
for a particular park.18 The second would involve incentive
zoning whereby developers would pay into endowments for
particular parks in exchange for the right to build bigger
buildings nearby.19 Both tools are already in limited use in the
New York City for preservation of landmarks and creation of
affordable housing.
A. TDR
New York law allows municipalities to create zoning
programs to transfer development rights from one site to another
to advance a wide range of public purposes.20 They include
efforts to “protect the natural, scenic or agricultural qualities of
open lands, to enhance sites and areas of special character or
special historical, cultural, aesthetic or economic interest or value
and to enable and encourage flexibility of design and careful
management of land in recognition of land as a basic and

16. See NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, POLICY ON PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN NEW YORK STATE
PARKS AND HISTORIC SITES (2009) (signed by Commissioner Carol Ash on March
12, 2009).
17. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-d (McKinney 2014); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b
(McKinney 2014).
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-f.
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valuable natural resources.”21
The programs are simple:
developers can acquire development rights from one site and use
them on another. The sending site loses those development rights
forever, but the site’s owner receives market-rate compensation.22
State law requires municipalities to implement TDR programs in
accordance with a “well-considered plan” and subject them to
environmental review under the State Environmental Quality
A
Review Act—requirements that apply to all zoning.23
successful TDR program must therefore designate suitable
receiving sites that (1) can accommodate additional bulk and (2)
that are likely to attract the interest of developers.24
TDR programs are unquestionably suitable for preserving
unprotected land in private hands. For example, Suffolk County
has a very successful program whereby developers can “buy”
development rights from owners of sensitive Pine Barren habitat
and use the rights in designated receiving zones.25 The owners
receive compensation for giving up development rights on their
land, and growth is directed to locations near existing transit,
schools and other amenities. Developers can build denser
developments in receiving zones than would otherwise be
allowed.26

21. Id. § 20-f(2).
22. Id. § 20-f(2)(e).
23. Id. § 20-f(2)(a).
24. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-f(2)(a). The law adds one additional
environmental review requirement beyond that normally required by SEQRA—
evaluation of the impact of TDR on potential development of low and moderate
income housing in sending districts. Id. § 20-f(2)(f). The law’s concern is that by
reducing the allowable density in preservation zones, future construction of low
and moderate income housing will end. See id.
25. CENTRAL PINE BARRENS JOINT PLANNING & POLICY COMM’N, THE PINE
BARRENS CREDIT: TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
(2010), available at http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/pbc_overview.pdf.
26. New York State created the Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning and
Policy Commission in 1993 to oversee the creation of the TDR program aimed at
protecting the sensitive Pine Barrens region of Suffolk County, New York. See
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION LAW § 57-0119 (McKinney 2014). Amendments
followed to the zoning codes of the towns of Brookhaven, Riverhead, and
Southhampton to implement the restrictions and TDR program. Information
about the Commission’s work can be found at New York State’s Central Pine
Barrens, http://www.pb.state.ny.us/, archived at http://perma.cc/6JQQ-2TJV.
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There is a limited track record for using TDR programs to
fund existing parks. New York City has a limited TDR program
intended to benefit an existing open space, the High Line, a 1.45
mile-long park constructed on an elevated former freight rail
line.27 Under the 2005 Special West Chelsea District regulations,
owners of development sites under the High Line can buy 1.0
FAR (floor area ratio) of development rights by making a fifty
dollar per square foot contribution to the High Line Improvement
The hybrid TDR/incentive scheme is limited: the
Fund.28
transferred floor area is restricted to commercial development
and can only be used after the site owner has sold its existing
development rights to eligible receiving lots in the Special West
Chelsea District.29 Developers have seldom used the program to
date.30 The Hudson River Park Trust is also exploring a more
traditional TDR program to sell development rights from its
decaying Pier 40 to potential development sites on the other side
of an adjacent highway.31
Except for the limited TDR program for the High Line, New
York municipalities have not used the programs to generate
funds for existing parks or protected open spaces. Admittedly,
there are two complications to be overcome. First, state law
requires sending zones to thereafter be protected through a
conservation easement, which is a preservation tool generally

27. CITY PLANNING COMM’N, CITY OF NEW YORK, ZONING RESOLUTION § 98-30,
31 (2015), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art09c08.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/P42K-EXVS.
28. Id. § 98-35.
29. Id. § 98-33.
30. See, e.g., Eliot Brown, Developers Want Easier Access to High Line Air
Rights; But Should City Fix Something that Doesn't Look Broken?, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Feb. 13, 2008, http://observer.com/2008/02/developers-want-easieraccess-to-high-line-air-rights-but-should-city-fix-something-that-doesnt-lookbroken/, archived at http://perma.cc/DNZ6-2FDU (developers’ desire for easier
access may be a factor leading to the infrequent use of the fund).
31. Charles V. Bagli, Possible Deal May Bring Money to Repair Pier 40 in
Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/
16/nyregion/possible-deal-may-bring-money-to-repair-pier-40-in-manhattan
.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3NBC-MDPM.
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used on privately owned land.32 Second, most city parks are not
zoned and thus do not have any development rights to sell.33
The first problem is resolvable because parks are already
protected under various state and city laws, which provide far
stronger protections than a conservation easement.34 Moreover,
there appears to be no bar to creating a conservation easement to
protect existing parkland, supplementing the protections of the
public trust doctrine.35 Municipalities regularly give or sell
easements to utility companies for gas and electric lines through
parks.36
The second problem is resolvable because the municipalities
can zone parks. In fact, some New York City parks are zoned. For
example:







Governors Island is zoned R3-2 (0.5 FAR))
Forthcoming Pier 42 Park is zoned M1-4 (2.0 FAR)
Portions of Lemon Creek Park are zoned C3 (0.5
FAR)
Mount Loretto State Preserve is zoned R1-1 (0.5
FAR)
Shooters Island is zoned M3-1 (2.0 FAR)
Brooklyn Bridge Park is zoned M2-1 (2.0 FAR)

32. N.Y ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303 (McKinney 2014) (defining
conservation easements allowable by law).
33. New York City zones land as residential, commercial or manufacturing,
which provides the land with development rights and restrictions. Most parks,
especially those that were parks before the 1961 zoning resolution, have no
zoning designation.
34. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050,
1055 (N.Y. 2001) (Public Trust Doctrine, reflected in case law and statutes,
requires parks’ use for non-parks-related purposes to have approval of the state
legislature); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2) (McKinney 2014).
35. To date, this type of easement is not precluded by legislation or case law.
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303 (McKinney 2014).
36. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES.,
HANDBOOK ON THE ALIENATION AND CONVERSION OF MUNICPAL PARKLAND IN NEW
YORK 28-29 (2012), available at http://parks.ny.gov/publications/documents
/AlienationHandbook.pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Unless it qualifies as de
minimis and thus exempt from the public trust doctrine, the State Legislature
must authorize the grant of an easement over parkland for nonpark purposes,
including utilities. See id. at 7.
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Hudson River Park is zoned M2-3 (2.0 FAR)37

These zoning classifications are relics of the prior uses of
these parks. But an innovative TDR zoning scheme could place
zoning classifications on existing parkland in order to create
development rights. There are potentially billions of dollars in
development rights at stake.
B. Incentive Zoning in New York City
Incentive zoning schemes avoid the awkwardness of the TDR
option described above.
New York State law allows
municipalities to create zoning “incentives or bonuses” to advance
physical, cultural or social policies.38 Developers that agree to
pay into a public improvement fund or construct public amenities
may earn the right to bypass various zoning limitations. For
example, New York City has an “inclusionary housing” bonus
that allows 20% more floor area in exchange for constructing
affordable housing in certain high-density residential zoning
districts.39 There is no bar to creating a similar scheme for a
developer’s making financing contributions to the maintenance of
nearby parkland in return for added bulk on their buildings.40
As with any zoning scheme, incentive zoning must be
developed in accordance with a well-considered plan and subject
to an environmental review.41 The municipality must also
consider the impact of incentive zoning on affordable housing, as
it would with TDR.42 Structured properly, zoning incentives for
park funding should increase the amount of affordable housing
while simultaneously benefitting parks, thus advancing Mayor

37. To find zoning maps for each park listed above, see CITY OF NEW YORK,
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, Zoning Maps (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html
/dcp/html/zone/zh_zmaptable.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/DMJ6-GRTG.
38. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-d(1)(c) (McKinney 2014).
39. See generally CITY PLANNING COMM’N, CITY OF NEW YORK, ZONING
RESOLUTION art. II ch. 3 §§ 23-90, 23-952 (2013).
40. An incentive zoning scheme can require developers to provide specific
capital improvements for the public (e.g., transit improvements) or provide
payments for specific civic purposes. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-d(3)(h).
41. Id. § 81-d(3)(d).
42. Id. § 81-d(3)(g).
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Bill de Blasio’s goal of creating or preserving 200,000 units of
affordable housing.43
V.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC-PUBLIC
PARTNERSHIPS

Direct state and federal funding for parks is likely to be very
constrained over the next decade.44 It appears likely, however,
that there will be money available for (1) stormwater control and
climate resiliency, (2) transportation, (3) affordable housing, and
(4) public health.45 NYC Parks and OPRHP need to strategize
about creating partnerships with public agencies receiving these
funds to benefit parks. Barring these public-public partnerships,
there is little federal and state funding available directly for
parks.
A. Climate Change and Stormwater Management
Hurricane Sandy had a devastating impact on coastal parks.
The City is using federal funds to create more resilient coastlines,
particularly on the Rockaway Peninsula and Staten Island.46
Congress allocated over $60 billion to Hurricane Sandy relief in
the tri-state region including New York City.47 HUD, which
received $16 billion in Community Development Block Grants
(CDBGs), has already allocated $3.2 billion directly to New York

43. BILL DE BLASIO & ALICIA GLEN, CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK, A
FIVE-BOROUGH TEN-YEAR PLAN 5 (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html
/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf.
44. See infra Part VIII.
45. See generally infra Part VIII.
46. The Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency allows resiliency projects
to be tracked by location. See OFFICE OF RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY, CITY OF
NEW
YORK,
PLANYC
PROGRESS
REPORT
2014
(2014),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_
FINAL_Web.pdf.
47. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4,
36 (2013) (allocating billions to various agencies, including $16 billion to the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for Community
Development Block Grants); see also Raymond Hernandez, $51 Billion in Aid for
Hurricane Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
01/29/nyregion/congress-gives-final-approval-to-hurricane-sandy-aid.html?_r=0,
archived at http://perma.cc/P9ZW-PTVE.
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City.48 The State received even more monies from the federal
government to be used through areas impacted by Sandy,
including the City.
The City and State are vigorously planning to use these
funds for rebuilding and improving its coastal parks.49 They are
up against a clock: Congress requires the relief funds to be
expended by September 30, 2017,50 and HUD requires its funds
to be expended within two years of allocation.51 The very
complicated coastal barriers, dunes, reefs, rehabilitated wetlands
and other ecosystem infrastructure created with these disaster
relief funds can be built quickly, but will require maintenance
throughout their usable life. HUD regulations generally limit use
of CDBG funds to initial improvements, not long-term
maintenance.52 However, it is possible that a fund or endowment
could be established with CDBG monies for future capital
improvements to storm-related infrastructure in parks.53 There
are compelling policy reasons to do so, as long-term maintenance
48. Allocations,
Common
Application,
Waivers,
and
Alternative
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg.
14,329, (Mar. 5, 2013); Second Allocation, Waivers, and Alternative
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg.
69,104, (Nov. 18, 2013).
49. See generally CITY OF NEW YORK, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK
ch. 21, at 426-27 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads
/pdf/final_report/Ch21_Appendix_Initiatives_FINAL_singles.pdf.
50. 127 Stat. at 36; Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and
Alternative Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy,
78 Fed. Reg. 14,329, 14,332.
51. Allocations,
Common
Application,
Waivers,
and
Alternative
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg.
14,329, 14,332.
52. See generally 24 CFR § 570.201 (2014) (lists eligible activities); Categories
of Eligible Activities, in COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM
(2001), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=
DOC_17133.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JTP7-EEQS. HUD guidance
explains that operation and maintenance is generally not permitted, but further
explains that certain operating and maintenance-type activities necessary to
arrest imminent dangers are allowed. Id. at 2-30, 2-88; see also 24 C.F.R. §
570.207(b)(2).
53. See generally Categories of Eligible Activities, supra note 52.
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would reduce or eliminate the need for more federal funding after
future disasters. A specific determination should be sought from
HUD on this topic.
B. Transportation
The U.S. Department of Transportation is another viable
source of funding for transportation projects involving parks.
Federal transportation funds have been available to parks
through multi-year funding bills like the Intermodal Surface
Transportation and Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, the
Transportation Enhancement Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21)
of 1998, and the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century
Act (MAP-21) of 2012.54 Eligible projects have included biking,
hiking, and pedestrian improvement projects in parks.55 New
York State received at least $67 million in 2014 for these sorts of
projects.56
These funds are dwarfed by the federal monies made
available for traditional highway work. New York State, for
example, received $1.3 billion from the Federal Transportation
Administration for fiscal year 2014.57 It could be possible to tap
traditional transportation funds for maintenance and restoration
of parks immediately adjacent to highways. Many flagship parks
are adjacent to or bisected by highways (sometimes by design)
that damage the nearby open space and increase the costs of their
maintenance, cause polluted run-off to water bodies, and create
pedestrian and wildlife barriers. Conversely, those parks serve
54. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
126 Stat. 405 (2012); Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L.
No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998); Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
55. 23 U.S.C. § 101(a)(30)(B)(ii) (2012).
56. Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, N.Y.S. Governor, Governor Cuomo
Announces $67 Million in Funding for Bicycle, Pedestrian and Multi-Use Path
Enhancement
Projects
(January
15,
2014),
available
at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-67-millionfunding-bicycle-pedestrian-and-multi-use-path-enhancement,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/85HX-48MH.
57. Funding by State, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.fta.dot.
gov/12853_88.html
(last
visited
Apr.
30,
2015),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/V4ZY-9Q4Z (providing detailed analysis of FTA’s annual
appropriations to states by program).
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essential transportation purposes by serving as a buffer between
highways
and
residential
communities.
Joint
parkstransportation planning should recognize this relationship and
tap into federal funds for regular restoration of parkland adjacent
to highways.
C. Ecosystem Services
Many of the ecosystem services that parks provide are hard
to quantify and monetize. For example, parks filter air pollution,
cool temperatures in the urban heat island, and provide wildlife
habitat. But at least one habitat providing ecosystem services—
wetlands on NYC Parks property—can be monetized to the
benefit of parks through the creation of wetlands mitigation
banks.58
Under the U.S. Clean Water Act and New York Tidal
Wetlands Act, the destruction of tidal wetlands requires a permit
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and N.Y. State
Department of Environmental Conservation.59 Although not
required by the statutes, these agencies generally require
mitigation as a condition for issuing a permit that allows
destruction of wetlands.60 Mitigation usually takes the form of
permanent protection of wetlands or restoration of degraded
wetlands. Developers and some government agencies, such as the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, often seek to buy
mitigation credits, but there are few such banks supplying credits
in the New York metropolitan area.

58. JOSH FOSTER ET AL., CTR FOR CLEAN AIR POL’Y, THE VALUE OF GREEN
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR URBAN CLIMATE ADAPTATION 3 (2011), available at
http://ccap.org/assets/The-Value-of-Green-Infrastructure-for-Urban-ClimateAdaptation_CCAP-Feb-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NQR4-RVLW.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (requiring section 404 for permits for discharges
of dredge or fill material into navigable waters). See generally N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 25-0401 (McKinney 2014) (broadly regulating activities
impacting tidal wetlands).
60. 33 C.F.R. § 332.1 (a)(1) (2014) (“The purpose of this part is to establish
standards and criteria for the use of all types of compensatory mitigation,
including on-site and off-site permittee-responsible mitigation, mitigation
banks, and in-lieu fee mitigation to offset unavoidable impacts to waters of the
United States authorized through the issuance of Department of the Army (DA)
permits pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act.”).
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Restoring degraded wetlands is incredibly expensive. A 2012
City wetlands report therefore recommended creating a privatelyoperated wetlands mitigation bank operated on city property. It
states:
The City will develop a mitigation banking or in-lieu fee
mechanism for public projects. These are strategies for
undertaking restoration projects that can then provide “credits”
to multiple projects that require mitigation, at one or more
locations carefully chosen and approved in advance by regulators.
Both mechanisms provide numerous benefits over the current
system by consolidating funding into larger projects that produce
economies and ecologies of scale.61

In late 2013, the New York City Economic Development
issued a request for expressions of interest (RFEI) for a private
partner to develop a wetlands mitigation bank on sixty-eight
acres near Saw Mill Creek on Staten Island.62 The creek flows
into the Arthur Kill and has been degraded by highways,
landfills, and pollution. The private partner would, presumably,
fund all or most of the cost of restoring the wetlands in return for
the right to sell those credits to developers and agencies that need
Clean Water Act section 404 permits from the U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers. The City reportedly received a poor response to the
RFEI. It should try again in light of the successful wetlands
mitigation banks being developed in other states.
Given the costs that a private partner would incur to restore
wetlands in order to create saleable credits, it is very unlikely
that the City or State would profit from these programs. It would,
however, find a private source of revenue for restoring the
hundreds of degraded wetlands in parks. The City and State may
also be able to cooperate with the National Park Service for the
creation of such a program in Gateway National Recreation Area,
which includes almost 10,000 acres of federally owned wetlands

61. N.Y.C. WETLANDS STRATEGY, supra note 3.
62. Press Release, N.Y.C. Econ. Dev. Corp., NYCEDC Releases Request for
Expressions of Interest to Establish First Wetlands Bank in New York City
(Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nycedc.com/press-release/nycedcreleases-request-expressions-interest-establish-first-wetlands-bank-new-york,
archived at http://perma.cc/MR9R-8RVQ.
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that are vitally important to buffering Brooklyn, Queens, and
Staten Island from coastal storms and sea level rise.
VI.

STATE AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC BENEFIT
CORPORATIONS

New state-created entities might be used to restore existing
parks. State entities already play a major role in the City’s most
important parks. They include state-controlled public benefit
corporations like the Battery Park City Authority, Hudson River
Park Trust, and Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation and citycontrolled (but state-created) public benefit corporations like the
Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation. Another major
park on Governors Island was originally overseen by the statecreated Governors Island Planning and Education Corporation,
which was replaced by the city-created Trust for Governors
Island.63
Because the state corporations can override local land-use
controls,64 do not pay local property taxes,65 and are not subject
to local politics, they can be nimble tools for turning around
deteriorated neighborhoods and their parks. As noted above,
these state-city partnerships are already in use for parks in New
York City. The state parks mentioned above face daunting and
unresolved capital costs, yet they are generally well maintained
with a steady revenue stream from adjacent real estate.66
63. The Urban Development Corporation (d/b/a Empire State Development
Corporation) has the authority to create subsidiaries and is the likely entity to
oversee the creation of new state public benefit corporations to address the goals
outlined in this paper. For example, the Urban Development Corporation
created the Moynihan Station Development Corporation in 1995 to oversee the
conversion of the U.S. Post Office’s Farley Building in Manhattan into a new
commuter rail station. Phase 1 of the project, which will create commuter
access to Amtrak and other improvements, is underway. Moynihan Station Dev.
Corp.: About the Project, EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 4, 2015, 11:27 AM),
http://esd.ny.gov/Subsidiaries_Projects/MSDC/MSDC.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/K2C5-SEAF.
64. See In re Cnty. of Monroe, 530 N.E.2d 202, 204-05 (N.Y. 1988).
65. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 404 (West 2014).
66. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6388 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §
1974 (McKinney 2014) (powers); id. § 1974-b. These laws provide the Roosevelt
Island Operating Corporation and the Battery Park City Authority with the
power to collect rents on the land they control in NYC. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §
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Moreover, the state entities are held directly accountable for the
conditions of the public amenities they operate. The result is a
higher level of care and maintenance than is provided to most
city-run parks.
The creation of a new state entity to operate parks in a
distressed community might work as follows. The city would
identify a park or group of nearby parks that are 1) in need and 2)
near substantial development sites that are under public control
or could be acquired through eminent domain. The Urban
Development Corporation, doing business as the Empire State
Development Corporation, is the state agency responsible with
the most logical role to play because of its economic development
mission and ability to create subsidiaries with all of its statutory
powers.67 It would create a new subsidiary with the mission to
acquire and develop the land, carry out public improvements and
maintain existing parks.68 To attract developers, the state entity
would fund some initial public improvements with state and city
appropriations and bond issuances. It would then offer publicly
owned or controlled land to developers at a reduced cost. Rather
than pay property taxes, developers of this public land would
make “payments in lieu of taxes” directly to the state entity to be
used exclusively for repaying bonds, maintaining public
improvements and restoring parks.69
This method of
development and revenue generation is already used by the state
entities mentioned above.
The technique could be paired with affordable housing
requirements. For example, the City and Urban Development
Corporation partnered in 1968 to develop Roosevelt Island with
parks, streets, new schools, and thousands of units of affordable
6388; N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1974. In the case of BPCA, the statute is specific in
saying that property owners do not pay real estate taxes to NYC but rather give
those revenues to the BPCA. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1974. Roosevelt Island
Operating Corporation and BPCA are thus able to generate their own revenues
and use them to maintain streets, sidewalks, and parks.
67. Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6255(8),
6262 (McKinney 2014).
68. See generally N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6255(8), 6262 (the Urban
Development Corporation is empowered to create subsidiaries that have all of
the parent corporation’s powers).
69. To bypass local property taxes, the state entity must own or control the
land.
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housing.70 The Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation (RIOC)
enforces affordable housing requirements through its ground
leases with private developers, and has thus created thousands of
affordable housing units.71 With the revenue from the leases, the
corporation maintains various public services on the Island,
including parks.72 Without this state-city partnership, Roosevelt
Island’s excellent parks would otherwise not exist. Besides having
greater budget authority, the state public benefit corporations
like RIOC also have greater planning autonomy, eminent domain
authority, and the ability to override local land-use controls.73
VII.

BIDS AND PIDS

New York State law allows any municipality to establish a
business improvement district (hereinafter BID) to restore or
promote business activity by building and maintaining
improvements,
including
parks,
landscaping,
and
74
transportation.
Under the BID law, municipalities can create
nonprofit corporations to receive a supplement property tax,
sometimes called an “assessment,” that is exclusively used for the
public services outlined above.75 New York City has over sixty
BIDs that largely focus on maintenance of streets, sidewalks, and
public plazas.76

70. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6292 (McKinney 2014). The Urban
Development Corporation and New York City entered into a 99 year lease for
Roosevelt Island that required the Urban Development Corporation to carry out
a “general development plan” for affordable housing, transit, parks, and other
improvements. In 1984, the Urban Development Corporation created a
subsidiary, the Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation (RIOC), to continue its
duties on the Island. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6385 (McKinney 2014).
71. Alan Finder, Roosevelt Island: A ‘Wonderful’ Experiment Still Building,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
26,
1990,
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/26/
nyregion/roosevelt-island-a-wonderful-experiment-still-building.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/7TWD-WTNE.
72. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6388 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §
1974 (McKinney 2014) (powers); see also id. § 1974-b.
73. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6389(3) (McKinney 2014).
74. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c (McKinney 2014).
75. Id. § 980-c(a).
76. N.Y.C. SMALL BUS. SERVS., STARTING A BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT A
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE 2 (2015), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sbs/
downloads/pdf/bid_guide_complete.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8GNX-T4X3.
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BIDs have the potential to raise millions of dollars for the
maintenance of parks with few adverse effects on nearby property
owners. In fact, BIDs are specifically geared towards
maintenance and are, therefore, uniquely suited to addressing
the maintenance shortfall plaguing urban parks.77 In New York
City there are two BIDs operating as Park Improvement Districts
(PIDs). The Bryant Park Corporation collects about $1 million
annually from nearby property owners; this $1 million makes up
only a small portion of the Bryant Park Corporation’s annual $12
million budget for Bryant Park.78 The Union Square Partnership
raises about $1.5 million annually.79 Both districts are narrowly
drawn to include only large commercial properties very close to
the parks.
There is nothing in New York State law, however, that
prohibits the creation of much larger districts that can raise
millions annually for the parks they surround. Four
misconceptions have probably limited their use for parks to date.
 Misconception 1: Residents must approve the creation of
the district.
Partially incorrect: In New York State, the law requires
approval of a majority of the owners in the proposed district. In
New York City, the City Council votes on the creation of a district
subject to review and recommendations by community boards and
the City Planning Commission. Only if at least fifty-one percent
of property owners file petitions in opposition does state or city
law prohibit the council from establishing the district.80 In
practice, the Council seeks community consensus.
77. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-a(4).
78. BRYANT PARK CORP. & BRYANT PARK MGMT. CORP. & KPMG LLP,
CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
3-4
(2013),
available
at
http://www.bryantpark.org/static/pdfs/reports/Bryant_Park_FY_2013.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/2R5J-FQJQ.
79. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF SMALL BUS. SERVS., NYC BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
PROFILES
2008-2009
11,
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sbs/
downloads/pdf/BID%20book%20final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E24F8GLJ (listing income from the assessment of $1,439,000).
80. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 25-406(b) (2014) (enacted pursuant to N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(a)).
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 Misconception 2: Residential properties cannot be taxed.
Incorrect: The BID law anticipates that both commercial and
residential property owners will be taxed.81
 Misconception 3: BIDs cannot primarily benefit parks.
Partially incorrect: The law calls for the creation and
maintenance of improvements to “restore or promote business
activity in the district.”82 Given the clear link between wellmaintained parks and property values, this link is easy to
establish. Moreover, park concessions already generate tens of
millions of dollars for the city and state.
 Misconception 4: BIDs cannot raise enough money to
meaningfully maintain parks.
Incorrect: BIDS can raise money to completely transform the
maintenance of large parks. For example, at least 40,000 people
live within census tracts immediately bordering Van Cortlandt
Park.83 Assuming an average household size of 2.6 persons, there
are about 15,000 housing units near the park. With an average
supplemental property tax per household of $100, a PID for Van
Corlandt Park would raise $1.5 million annually. This is enough
to hire two dozen new staff members dedicated solely to
maintenance of this park.
Remarkably, BIDs can also include cooperation by two
municipalities. The law would allow, for example, New York City
and Yonkers to jointly fund and operate Van Corltandt Park for
81. Id. § 25-414(b) (enacted pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-n(d)).
Neither the state nor city laws contain any provision limiting taxation to
commercial properties. In fact, the laws require the board of directors of the
district management association to include residents.
82. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 25-404(a) (2014) (enacted pursuant to N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c(a)).
83. N.Y.C. Census FactFinder, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING,
http://maps.nyc.gov/census/#, archived at http://perma.cc/CH8C-KBJC.
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the benefit of both municipalities.84 The creation of BIDs for
existing parks will not be easy, as shown by the failed proposals
from the Hudson River Park Trust and Friends of the High
Line.85 For large, flagship parks, however, these districts are the
best alternative revenue source for maintenance that does not
require new legislation.
Some park advocates propose a citywide park tax as an
alternative to park-specifics PIDs. Chicago has had a Chicago
Park Tax District since 1934.86 It is operated by a distinct
municipal corporation that imposes property taxes separately
from the city, the city’s school district, and the county.87 It is
entirely responsible for funding the city’s parks, comprising 8,000
acres in 585 parks.88 Most of its revenues come from the property
tax with the rest coming from bonds, permit fees, and concession
fees.89 The system works well and is commended by independent
authorities. For example, the Trust for Public Land gives Chicago
a decent rating in its online “Park Score” system.90
Seattle voters approved the creation of a city-wide park
district in the August 2014 elections.91 The system will work a
little differently from Chicago’s district, as the City of Seattle will
84. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980, 980-n(a) (McKinney 2014).
85. See generally Annie Karni, Advocates Eye Levy to Save Hudson River
Park, CRAIN’S N.Y BUS., June 2, 2013, http://www.crainsnewyork
.com/article/20130602/HOSPITALITY_TOURISM/306029987/advocates-eye-levy
-to-save-hudson-river-park, archived at http://perma.cc/E462-64LB; Dana
Rubenstein, Special Tax Sought to Fund Hudson River Park, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703555404576195
520506542928#livefyre-comment, archived at http://perma.cc/T4H7-LJ3N.
86. History, CHICAGO PARK DIST., http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/aboutus/history/, archived at http://perma.cc/4YFU-4L93.
87. See CHICAGO PARK DIST., 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY 28-29 (2015), available at
http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/assets/1/23/2015_Budget_Summary__Adopted_Budget_12.12.14_-_Web1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/E34CDPHH?type=pdf [hereinafter 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY].
88. CHICAGO PARK DIST., supra note 86.
89. 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 87, at 5.
90. City Profiles, PARKSCORE, http://parkscore.tpl.org/city.php?city=Chicago
(last visited Mar. 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G8M5-6EFF.
91. City of Seattle Proposition No. 1 Seattle Park District, KING COUNTY
ELECTIONS,
https://electionsdata.kingcounty.gov/2014/election-results-aug/two
/Ballot%20measures/City%20of%20Seattle%20Proposition%20No.%201%20Seat
tle%20Park%20District (last updated Feb. 24, 2014), archived at
https://perma.cc/ZT7B-FC7H.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1

20

1_RIZZO FINAL_EDITED

2015]

10/2/2015 2:17 PM

EQUITABLE PARKS FUNDING

655

continue to fund parks at pre-existing levels from the general
budget. The Seattle Park District will provide supplemental
revenue through a new property tax of $0.33 per $1,000 of
assessed value, which translates to about $149 annually for a
$450,000 home.92 It is expected to raise $47.9 million per year.93
A city-wide park tax district would be challenging in New
York. First, like any new tax, the municipality would require
approval of the New York State Legislature, which is currently
hostile to the creation of any new tax. Second, to actually have
net benefit for parks, the municipality would need to commit to
maintain current levels of budget support. Third, community
support for a new general tax is likely to be very weak. The
existing BID law is preferable because it has the potential to
create real community buy-in: it would be a small new tax
structured to directly benefit those paying it.
VIII.

DEDICATED PARK FUNDS

One of the biggest lost opportunities for park funding is the
State’s annual failure to finance the Environmental Protection
Fund (EPF).94 The State Legislature created the fund in 1993 to
pay for solid waste management, parks, historic preservation and
open space.95 It is funded almost entirely through the State’s real
estate transfer tax, which generates over $700 million per year.96
92. SEATTLE,
WASH.,
ORDINANCE
124467
(2014),
available
at
http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~scripts/nph-brs.exe?s3=&s4=124467&s5=&s1=&s2=
&S6=&Sect4=AND&l=0&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURON&Sect5=CBORY&S
ect6=HITOFF&d=ORDF&p=1&u=%2F~public%2Fcbor1.htm&r=1&f=G#hb,
archived at http://perma.cc/6ZT4-LKEJ.
93. Id. For more information about the Seattle Park District, visit the King
County
board
of
elections
webpage.
KING
COUNTY
ELECTIONS,
http://kingcounty.gov/elections/election-info/2015/201502.aspx,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/589A-XH2V (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
94. See generally WE LOVE NEW YORK, http://www.keepprotectingny.com,
archived at http://perma.cc/595H-3J4L (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (stating that a
statewide coalition of environmental organizations, is advocating for greater
EPF funding).
95. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-s (McKinney 2013).
96. See generally N.Y. TAX LAW § 1402 (McKinney 2014). See also N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, 2013-2014 NEW YORK STATE TAX COLLECTIONS:
STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AND HISTORICAL TABLES 8 (2014), available at
http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/stats/stat_fy/2013_14_annual_statistical_report_of_ny
_state_tax_collections.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XT5M-BF9Q?type=pdf.
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The fund is dependent, however, on legislative appropriations:
the State’s governors and legislators have traditionally allocated
less than $200 million to the fund, using the remainder to balance
the state budget.97
Although the state real estate transfer tax is well known to
home-owning New York State residents, the public is largely
unaware that the tax was intended to directly benefit parks and
the environment. Park advocates have so far been unable to tell
the story. Based on its share of the state’s population, New York
City could secure $200 million from the fund each year.98 The
city should therefore mount an extensive public relations
campaign to end Albany’s practice of raiding the EPF to balance
the state budget. Some states like New Jersey have amended
their constitutions to prohibit the legislatures from using
dedicated environmental taxes for other purposes.99 Advocates
for the EPF should consider the same for New York.
Congress has similarly used the U.S. Land and Water
Conservation Fund (LWCF) to balance the federal budget since
its creation in 1964. The federal government funds the LWCF
primarily through fees for mineral, oil and gas extraction licenses
on the outer continental shelf.100 All license fees are deposited in
the fund. The law allows Congress to allocate up to $900 million
to federal, state and local park projects each year until the fund’s
expiration in 2015. 101
Revenues from offshore oil and gas drilling have risen
sharply in the past decade and now generate almost $10 billion
annually.102 Congress, however, has appropriated an average of

97. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-s; see also OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY
ANALYSIS, ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDING IN NEW YORK STATE 19 (2014), available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/environmental/environmental_funding_nys_2
014.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3JSP-JHDQ?type=pdf.
98. Id.
99. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
lawsconstitution/constitution.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/Y78Y-YDD9.
100. Land and Water Conservation Fund, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-5 (2014) (Congress
passed the Land and Water Conservation Fund act in 1964).
101. Id.
102. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-283, HIGH RISK SERIES, AN
UPDATE 76 (2013).
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only $300 million to the LWCF annually.103 The rest of the
money is swept into the nation’s $3.6 trillion budget.104
Nationwide park advocates like the City Parks Alliance and the
Land & Water Conservation Fund Coalition are lobbying
Congress to provide the full $900 million to park projects each
year and permanently reauthorize the LWCF.105 New York City
and State should join this advocacy campaign as they are
positioned to receive tens of millions each year from the LWCF.106
The $900 million cap should be annually raised, the law should be
permanently reauthorized and Congressional appropriations to
the fund should be mandatory.
IX.

OTHER FUNDING SOURCES IN BRIEF AND
THEIR POLITICAL OBSTACLES

The purpose of this paper is to identify the most promising
alternative revenue options for parks. However, there are several
other promising revenue options that may work for some parks.
A. Concessions
Despite some high-profile citizen lawsuits challenging
revenue-generating concessions in parks, there is little doubt
about their legality, so long as they serve park users. New York
103. Land and Water Conservation Fund, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-5; Land and Water
Conservation Fund, Our land, our water, our heritage: America Depends on the
land and water conservation fund, LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION FUND
COALITION,
available
at
http://lwcfcoalition.org/files/LWCFInfo/LWCF
_general_factsheet.pdf
(last
visited
Mar.
4,
2015),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/483L-LN3D.
104. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2015: HISTORICAL
TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 25 (2015), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/H9E6-EHQR (demonstrating that the Federal
Government’s total budget for the year 2014 is approximately $3.6 trillion).
105. LAND & WATER CONSERVATION FUND COAL., LAND AND WATER
CONSERVATION FUND: 50 YEARS OF CONSERVING AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL 2, 3
(2014),
available
at
http://www.lwcfcoalition.org/files/LWCF_
50thAnniversaryReport_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YA5L-NLQJ.
106. This is a rough estimation based upon New York City and New York
State’s proportion of the general population, or approximately 19 million out of
318 million. U.S. and World Population Clock, CENSUS.GOV (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.census.gov/popclock/, archived at http://perma.cc/L3ZZ-B5D8.
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City, in the 2009 fiscal year, generated about $110 million from
park concessions.107 OPRHP raises a similar amount in state
parks.108 There is room for growth in many flagship parks that
lack restaurants and other amusements. The problem for NYC
Parks is that the New York City Charter requires it to surrender
any revenue it generates to the general city fund.109 OPRHP
faces the same problem. NYC Parks and OPRHP must rely on the
City Council and State Legislature to return the monies in the
annual budget.110
There are two ways around the “general fund” problem. First,
for parks maintained by conservancies, the city and state can
authorize the conservancy to directly collect concession revenues
and use them to maintain the park.111 Second, the city and state
can require concessionaires to be responsible for maintenance and
improvements to designated areas.
B. Sponsorships
In 2012, New York City unsuccessfully issued an RFP for
corporate sponsorships of certain park amenities like dog runs
and basketball courts. The RFP failed to generate substantial
interest in part because the sponsorship opportunities were so
modest. Sponsorships can work, however, if the arrangement
provides adequate publicity in return. In 2004, NYC Parks won
$10 million from Carl Icahn for the construction of Icahn Stadium
on Randalls Island (Manhattan).112 In 2013, the Prospect Park
Alliance won $10 million from the Lefrak family to build the
107. Concessions, NYC PARKS, http://www.nycgovparks.org/opportunities
/concessions, archived at http://perma.cc/E5DG-2Y5Y (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
108. Tables, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES.,
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy1314archive/eBudget1314/agencyPres
entations/appropData/tables_ParksRecreationandHistoricPreservationOfficeof.h
tml, archived at https://perma.cc/FBA8-WDVM (last updated Jan. 22, 2013).
109. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 109 (2012).
110. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 109.
111. See Concessions, supra note 107.
112. Press Release, N.Y.C. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor, Mayor
Michael R. Bloomberg, Parks & Recreation Commission Adrian Benepe & the
Randall’s Island Sports Foundation Name New York City’s Newest Athletic
Facility Icahn Stadium (Jan. 28, 2004), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/021-04/mayor-michael-bloomberg-parks-recreation-commissioneradrian-benepe-the-randall-s-island, archived at http://perma.cc/YXF4-UWW3.
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Lefrak Center at Lakeside (Brooklyn).113 High-profile capital
projects such as these are likely to attract sponsors. Although
some park advocates will claim that corporate sponsorships and
naming contribute to the over-commercialization of parks,
sponsorships and naming rights raise no legal issues.
C. Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs)
CBAs are usually private agreements between developers
and community groups to provide support for schools, parks, jobs,
and social services. They have no legal status in local land-use
review processes.114 But developers often use them to win
support for a project, and elected officials sometimes unofficially
link their support for a project to a developer’s willingness to
enter into a CBA. While legal experts have raised some objections
to CBAs because they create a shadow land-use process, CBAs
can provide large, once-in-a-lifetime park funds. Their use for
creation of operating endowments for parks is particularly
promising since long-term park maintenance is in any developer’s
best interest.
D. “Capitalizing” Maintenance Costs
State law prohibits the issuance of state bonds to cover
general government operating expenses.115
It is possible,
however, that NYC Parks or OPRHP could build future costs to
renovate capital improvements into a legislative appropriation or
bond issuance as a “capital” rather than a “maintenance”
expense. The money would be set aside in an endowment to cover
future maintenance costs. The City and State should consult with
113. Press Release, Prospect Park Alliance, Lakeside Receives $10 Million Gift
from LeFrak Family (Nov. 11, 2013), http://prospectpark.org/media/filer
_public/2d/59/2d59a7e6-f698-4e8f-8472-8fa0b887d238/111113-lakeside-receives10-million-gift-from-lefrak-family-final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6R89TYER.
114. See generally N.Y.C. BAR ASSOC., THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY BENEFIT
AGREEMENTS IN N.Y.C’S LAND USE PROCESS (Mar 8, 2010), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071844-TheRoleofCommunity
BenefitAgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
W26F-56NE (The New York City Bar Association released a comprehensive and
highly critical report on CBAs).
115. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 67-b(3) (McKinney 2004).
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their respective comptrollers’ offices, which would need to sign off
on any approach of this type.
E. Selective Alienation
The public trust doctrine prohibits the sale or lease of
parkland for any purpose without state legislative approval.116
The practice of selling, leasing or otherwise using parkland for
nonpark purposes (referred to as “alienation”) is highly
controversial and often litigated.117 Nonetheless, New York’s
municipalities have occasionally sought legislative approval for
the creation of public infrastructure in a park, like New York
City’s controversial water filtration plant in Van Cortland
The State Legislature traditionally requires
Park.118
replacement parkland or financial mitigation in return for
parkland alienation.119
A few large parks with inaccessible areas, especially former
solid waste landfills, may be suitable for revenue generation from
non-park uses like solar panel arrays, wind turbines or
stormwater management infrastructure. Moreover, long-term
leases for certain private, revenue-generating uses like catering
halls or golf courses may be appropriate in some locations. The
test for any such alienation action should be whether it would
directly contribute to the long-term maintenance of the impacted
park and have minimal impacts on public recreation and the
environment.

116. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050,
1053 (N.Y. 2001) (defining the public trust doctrine as follows: “no objects,
however worthy, . . . which have no connection with park purposes, should be
permitted to encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly
conferred.” (citing Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920)).
117. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050,
1053.
118. Legislative
Memorandum
relating
to
Ch.
175:
PARKS—
DISCONTINUANCE—NEW YORK CITY, 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 175 Legis.
Memo Ch. 175 (McKinney 2003).
119. HANDBOOK, supra note 36.
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F. General Obligation Bonds
Some states make good use of state-wide, voter-approved
bond acts to provide open space funding. New York State, by
contrast, has a limited ability to issue new bonds. The State
Comptroller reported in 2013 that the State can only borrow
another $509 million before reaching its constitutional debt
limit.120 State-wide bond initiatives that have previously funded
parks and open space, like the highly successful Clean
Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996, will therefore be difficult to
implement.
New York City is in slightly better standing with regard to
bonds. Its overall debt is quite high, at about $52 billion out of a
total debt limit of close to $76 billion. It can thus borrow another
$24 billion.121 New York City has not traditionally issued bonds
to pay for parks and it may be unwise to do so in light of looming
capital needs for transit, bridges, schools, and coastal climate
resiliency. The issuance of bonds to pay for joint park and
infrastructure projects would, however, be a smart idea.122
G. Capital Budget Reform
For the 2013 to 2014 fiscal year, the City’s budget gave NYC
Parks a discretionary capital fund of about $80 million dollars in
addition to its operating budget of $300 million dollars for the
first time.123 This discretionary fund is essential to allowing the

120. Press Release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller,
DiNapoli: State’s High Debt Limiting Options (Jan. 7, 2013),
www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/jan13/010713.htm,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/L2RY-5EZR. (Bonds issued by some state authorities (e.g.,
Battery Park City Authority) are not subject to the debt limit so long as the
bonds are not payable by the State.). See id. Moreover, tax-increment finance
bonds are not subject to the debt limit. See infra, notes 124-30 and
accompanying text.
121. N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, BUREAU OF FISCAL AND BUDGET STUDIES, FISCAL
YEAR 2013 ANNUAL REPORT ON CAPITAL DEBT AND OBLIGATIONS vii (Dec. 2012).
See also N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (defining municipal debt limits).
122. Capital budget reform is important in New York City where for the first
time, NYC Parks has its own, small discretionary capital budget. This practice
should be continued.
123. Dana Rubenstein, Mayor Continues City Parks Funding Policies, For
Now, CAPITAL N.Y. (May 9, 2014), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-
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department to address capital projects without being beholden to
specific appropriations from elected officials.
H. Tax Increment Finance (TIF)
Tax increment finance is a method of financing public
improvements based on projected future property tax revenues. A
government entity identifies public street, sidewalk, utility, or
open space improvements that it believes will encourage nearby
real estate development. It sells bonds to fund those
improvements and commits to using new property tax revenues
to repaying bondholders.124 The technique requires a certain
faith on the part of bondholders, who will only be repaid to the
extent that the public improvements actually increase property
tax revenue.125 Outside New York State, the technique works:
other states have issued billions in TIF bonds to fund public
improvements.126
New York State law allows state or local agencies to issue
TIF bonds too,127 but they have almost never done so.128 In 2005,
New York City considered selling TIF bonds to fund the Hudson
Yards project, which involved large public investments in a deck
above rail yards that would facilitate new development, parks
and roads.129 Concerns about revenue led to a hybrid approach
wherein the City remains responsible for paying back
bondholders from general city revenues.
A 2002 report by the New York City Independent Budget
Office summed up the City’s concerns about TIF bonds as follows:
hall/2014/05/8545118/mayor-continues-city-parks-funding-policies-now, archived
at http://perma.cc/477L-CUUS.
124. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o (McKinney 2014). See generally Amy F.
Cerciello, The Use of Pilot Financing to Develop Manhattan’s Far West Side, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 795, 796-801 (2005).
125. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o.
126. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and
the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 65 (2010).
127. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o.
128. Cerciello, supra note 124, at 816.
129. See generally N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, WEST SIDE FINANCING’S
COMPLEX, $1.3 BILLION STORY (2004), available at http://www.ibo.nyc.
ny.us/iboreports/WestsidefinanceFB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8C7MTPYW.
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Actual TIF revenues may fall short of the projections made when
the TIF bonds were sold. Unlike a municipality with a variety of
revenue sources to draw upon for debt service obligations, a TIF
district generally has only one source: incremental property
taxes. A shortfall risks default or a bailout using other municipal
revenues, undermining the reason for using TIF in the first
place. A revenue shortfall can occur for a variety of reasons. The
projected level of development might not be reached––or might be
reached with significant delay.130

These concerns can be addressed by issuing TIF bonds only
where nearby development is likely.
Moreover, revenue
calculations must remain conservative. If these two issues are
addressed, TIF can become a vital tool for generating major
capital funds for parks where they otherwise do not exist.
I. Other Federal Funds
Congress created the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery
Act (UPARR) in 1978 to provide matching grants to distressed
cities for park projects.131 Unlike the EPF and the LWCF, it is
funded out of the general budget rather than specific taxes. The
argument for full funding of UPARR is therefore slightly less
compelling. Congress has not funded the program at all since
2002. Nonetheless, because of its focus on distressed
communities, any funding would help New York’s urban parks.
X.

SUMMARY OF BEST PRACTICES

This paper has identified five core ways to raise park funding
for both maintenance and capital improvements without new
federal, state, or city legislation. They include the following: 1)
Tapping into real estate dollars using existing zoning tools (e.g.,
TDRs, zoning incentives); 2) Using the existing Business
Improvement District law to maintain parks; 3) Demanding full
130. Theresa J. Devine, Learning from Experience: A Primer on Tax Increment
Financing, N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE (Sept. 2002), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us
/iboreports/TIF-Sept2002.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S5B7-VD6Y.
131. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2514 (2012); see also NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
www.nps.gov/uparr (last vistied Dec. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UZ9UKHZD.
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state and federal funding for existing park funds; 4) Creating
public-public partnerships to tap into existing infrastructure
funds for capital and maintenance work in parks; and 5)
Pursuing proven management models using state agencies and
private conservancies. These approaches have the most promise
for creating new and reliable sources of both capital and
maintenance funds. There is no one-size-fits-all solution,
however, given the variety of parks, income levels, and
neighborhoods. Most important, community support will be
essential to the success of any park funding venture. Residents
are likely to react poorly to financing schemes that diminish the
public’s use of a park or are simply viewed as new citywide taxes.
Public support depends on keeping new revenues and their
benefits local, visible, and accounted for.
Appendix: List of Alternative Revenue Options
Addressed Above
1.
Transfers of Development Rights and Zoning
Incentives.
2.
Public-Public Partnerships for Climate Change,
Transportation, Affordable Housing and Public
Health.
3.
Park Improvement Districts
4.
State-Created Public Benefit Corporations
5.
Full Funding for the U.S. Land and Water
Conservation Fund and N.Y. State Environmental
Protection Fund
6.
Concessions
7.
Sponsorships and Naming Rights
8.
Capitalizing Maintenance Costs
9.
Selective Alienation of Parks
10.
General Obligation Bonds
11.
Capital Budget Reform
12.
Tax Increment Finance
13.
Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Program
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